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GANGMASTERING PASSATA: MULTI-TERRITORIALITY OF
THE FOOD SYSTEM AND THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
CHEAP LABOR BEHIND THE GLOBALIZED ITALIAN
TOMATO
Dr. Tomaso Ferrando*
ABSTRACT
Italy is the second largest producer of tomatoes in the world after the
United States, and it is often considered the homeland of this food. Yet, the
Italian tomato is much more than Italian. If one considers the people,
geography, regulations, and history behind the “golden pome” (pomo-d’oro
in Italian), there is no other conclusion than it is inherently local and global.
In the last years, the Italian tomato sector has been under scrutiny for reliance
on exploited labor, egregious living conditions, and the role of organized
crime in trading human beings as any other commodity (“gangmastering” or
caporalato). By embedding the Italian industrial tomato into a critical and
multi-territorial legal approach to the food system, my contribution aims to
offer a different perspective on the illegal action of labor intermediation as
one of the most discussed issues surrounding the production of Italian
tomatoes. Rather than presenting exploitation and caporalato as exceptions,
this paper analyzes them through the lenses of trade law, competition law,
and migration law as more appropriate lenses to understand the role of cheap
labor in the construction of the global Italian tomato. If that is the case, legal
interventions cannot be local and specific, but must be systemic, multilayered and, therefore, based on dialogue and solidarity among workers,
lawyers, activists, and academics across the whole tomato chain.
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I. TOMATOES: ITALIAN PRIDE WITH A GLOBAL SIDE
If there was a ranking of stereotypical images of Italy, the “pizza, pasta
& mafia” tryptic would certainly stand on the podium alongside loudness,
our love for “la dolce vita,” and the strong sense of family.1 This article is
not an attempt to use legal analysis to reproduce popular clichés. However, it
stems from the recognition that food and mafia are among the most
“exported” Italian “products” and that the global popularity of the former
may have something to do with the local strength of the latter. This does not
mean that all the Italian food is obtained or distributed with the support of
criminal organizations, nor that mafia would not exist without the control of
the food chain and the extraction of value from it. Yet, once we look closely
at the way in which part of the Italian food system operates, it is possible to
realize how the construction and interaction between spaces of legality and
illegality are embedded in “Made in Italy” as a brand that is recognized,
appreciated, and consumed all around the planet.
As an Italian, I decided to pick the example of the Italian processing
tomato and the Italian tomato sauce (passata) as a product that is mostly
associated with my territory, culture, and gastronomy. As a matter of fact,
when you visualize pizza and pasta in the stereotypical tryptic, did you not
imagine the former covered with a thin layer of passata and a dish of
spaghetti or a lasagna tray mixed with a Bolognese ragout? If we associate
Italy with tomatoes, it is not an accident but a consequence of the centrality
that tomatoes and the tomato industry have in the country’s recent economy
and in its international trade balance. If we want to challenge the
contemporary idea that food is a fetish to be admired on TV and shed some
light on the legal and social complexity that lies behind the Italian food

1 Nicole
Arriaga,
Pizza,
Pasta,
www.theamericanmag.com/pizza-pasta-mafia.

Mafia,

AM .

MAG.

(Feb.

25,

2011),
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system, there is no better place to start than with something so important for
the Italian economy and culture—tomatoes.2
Italy is the second in the world for annual volume of processing tomato,
after the US (mainly California) and followed by China.3 From North (mainly
Emilia Romagna, followed by Lombardia, Veneto, Piemonte, and Toscana)
to South (Puglia, Campania, Basilicata, Molise, and, to an extent, Sicily),
there are around 9,564 farms and 64,500 hectares of land dedicated to this
vegetable,4 with a total production of 4.8 million tons. More interestingly,
Italian processing companies (around ninety-one throughout the country)5
account for 49 percent of European and 13 percent of global transformation
of these tomatoes into juices, sauces, and other products, with annual revenue
estimated at 3.3 billion euros.6 Half of the processing tomatoes that are
transformed in Italy—worth 1.7 billion euros—is exported globally: it would
be unlikely, entering into a supermarket chain in a world capital, not to find
processed tomato coming from Italy.7 Of all products realized from
processing tomatoes, the Italian passata is by far the most popular among
consumers and the most commercialized and thus has been chosen as a
symbol to represent the whole tomato chain from farm to fork.8

2 Henry Bernstein & Liam Campling, Commodity Studies and Commodity Fetishism II: “Profits
with Principles”, 6 J. A GRARIAN CHANGE 414 (2006).
3 Pomodoro, l’Italia supera i 3 miliardi di fatturato, FOODWEB (Jan. 23, 2019),
https://www.foodweb.it/2019/01/pomodoro-italia-3-miliardi-fatturato/. Industrial tomato is different from
table tomato: the former is produced to be transformed into sauces or preserved, while the latter is
consumed fresh. The production of table tomato in Italy is shrinking and national varieties are suffering
from the increased import of table tomatoes produced within the EU (Netherlands and Spain above all),
but also outside of the European Union (Morocco and Northern Africa in particular). Profondo rosso per
il
pomodoro
italiano,
ITALIAFRUIT
NEWS
(Apr.
15,
2019),
http://www.italiafruit.net/DettaglioNews/49118/la-categoria-del-mese/profondo-rosso-per-il-pomodoroitaliano.
4 According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, tomato is botanically a fruit but is considered a
vegetable by nutritionists. In the absence of a hard-and-fast rule that clearly designates a botanical fruit as
a vegetable, the Encyclopedia concludes that it is acceptable for tomatoes to be classified as vegetables.
Melissa
Petruzzello,
Is
a
Tomato
a
Fruit
or
a
Vegetable?,
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/story/is-a-tomato-a-fruit-or-a-vegetable (last visited Jan. 31, 2020).
5 Domenico Perrotta, Produrre la qualità. I pomodori pelati tra industria, tradizione e conflitti,
93 MERIDIANA 71 (2018).
6 Pomodoro, Italia secondo trasformatore al mondo con 4,8 milioni di tonnellate, ANSA (Oct. 24,
2019, 1:53 PM), http://www.ansa.it/canale_terraegusto/notizie/business/2019/10/24/pomodoro-italiasecondo-trasformatore-al-mondo-48-mln-ton_66cee169-79be-4fec-af7c-6c3d41a97474.html.
7 Italy is the first producer of agricultural products in Europe, with a total value of its production
estimated at 55 billion euros per year and a processing sector worth 31.5 billion euros. Export is constantly
increasing at a pace that is faster than the European average. ISMEA, RAPPORTO SULLA COMPETITIVITA
DELL’AGROALIMENTARE ITALIANO (2018).
8

Italy accounts for 65 percent of the value of EU exported passata. Id.
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Italy is internationally perceived as the country of the tomato. However,
when we look at the reasons behind the Italian leadership in processing
tomatoes, we unveil a history that is much more global than stereotypes may
reveal. The link between Italy and tomatoes is a relatively short journey of
five centuries that started with the Spanish colonization of Latin America, the
cruel mission of Hernan Cortes around 1540,9 and the almost contemporary
annexation of the South of Italy by the Habsburg Empire, an essential
condition for the arrival of the tomatoes in the territories below Rome and
their diffusion in the perfect climatic conditions. Yet, the Italian processing
tomato industry would have not flourished—or not flourished in the same
way—without Napoleon’s investments in canning as an efficient way to
preserve food for his army and would not have reached the global market had
Garibaldi not led the “One Thousands” expedition in 1860 and opened the
flow of capital from the North to the South. It was then, when the fertile
territories of the South of Italy met the Northern capital and technological
innovation, that Italy became the fulcrum of the tomato processing industry,
with tens of processing plants in Parma and Piedmont receiving raw material
from the “Meridione” and exporting tomato paste and preserved peeled
tomatoes across Europe.
From a historical perspective, the success of the Italian passata is often
told as the outcome of a combination of violence, technology, the birth of
Italian capitalism, law, and politics. Yet, it is more. What is often missing
from this account—from contemporary academic and legal engagements
with the issue—is the role that people, and farmworkers especially, played
and still play in the construction of Italy as a global competitor in the
production and transformation of agricultural products—including
processing tomato.10 This was the case in 1861, when farmworkers in the
newly annexed South earned half the money of farmworkers in the North,
unemployment in the South was extremely high, living conditions were
extremely poor, and a cheap workforce supported the development of
processing facilities and transformation activities owned by Northern
families and the distribution of products across Europe.11 It is also the case
today, when thousands of workers—mainly EU migrants and non-European
citizens—are employed in the production of tomatoes (and other agricultural
products) without the guarantees of a minimum salary or a proper contract,
live in unhealthy and inadequate conditions, are often victims of abuses and
9

JOHN PAUL ZRONIK, HERNANDO CORTÉS: SPANISH INVADER OF MEXICO (2007).

10

LABOR RELATIONS IN GLOBALIZED FOOD (Alessandro Bonanno & Josefa Salete Barbosa
Cavalcanti eds., 2014).
11

PASQUALE VILLARI, LETTERE MERIDIONALI (1878); DENIS MACK SMITH, STORIA D’ITALIA
ed. 2011).

DAL 1861 AL 1997 (6th
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violence, and whose cheap labor is crucial in maintaining the competitiveness
of the Italian tomato.12 For some authors, we are facing a new ‘Questione
Meridionale’ (Southern Question), but this question is interconnected with
the global market.13
This article uses the example of the passata to combine a legal approach
to the response against the exploitative working conditions of farmworkers
in the Italian agricultural sector with the analysis of the political economy of
the food system in which they are embedded. The aim is not only to identify
opportunities and shortcomings of the legislative and regulatory
interventions that have been adopted but to highlight the importance of a
systemic approach to exploitation and to trigger considerations on the
interdependence of competitiveness and cheap lives. To set the stage, the next
section provides an overview of workers’ conditions in the agricultural sector
and introduces the phenomenon of caporalato (gangmastering) as a diffused
practice aimed at extracting value from workers taking advantage of their
state of need and inferior bargaining power. In Section III, the article presents
the three main national legal responses against caporalato and contemporary
forms of enslavement in the Italian agri-food sector, highlighting the most
recent transformations of the discipline along with the opportunities and
shortcomings of each legal structure. Then, Section IV departs from the
narrow focus on ‘worker-caporale-employer’ and embeds the tomato picker
in the context of national and international food chains to discuss the needs
for a multi-holistic approach based on the systemic understanding of the
economic, legal, and political dynamics underlying the distribution of power
and value between farmworkers, gangmasters, employers, and the rest of the
chain. Finally, the conclusion offers some elements of reflection on the
“Catch-22” situation experienced by Italy in the context of growing
competition, fragile economy, increase presence of migrants in the country,
and abandonment of the farmland.

12 The notion of cheapness is adopted from the work of Raj Patel and Jason W. Moore on the
construction of world capitalism through the extraction and appropriation of non-rewarded value from
people and nature. Cheapness is not only a material condition that refers to the price, but also indicates a
vision and an approach towards the planet and human beings that subordinates their needs and rights and
that takes advantage of their reproductive capacity. See JASON W. MOORE, CAPITALISM IN THE WEB OF
LIFE: ECOLOGY AND THE ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL (2015); RAJ PATEL & JASON W. MOORE, A
HISTORY OF THE WORLD IN SEVEN CHEAP THINGS: A GUIDE TO CAPITALISM, NATURE, AND THE FUTURE
OF THE PLANET (2017); RAJ PATEL, THE VALUE OF NOTHING: WHY EVERYTHING COSTS SO MUCH MORE
THAN WE THINK (2009).
13 LA GLOBALIZZAZIONE DELLE CAMPAGNE : MIGRANTI E SOCIETÀ RURALI NEL SUD ITALIA (Carlo
Colloca & Alessandra Corrado eds., 2013).

5 - FERRANDO (DO NOT DELETE)

526

2/22/2021 12:13 PM

[Vol. 14:521

FIU Law Review
II. EXPLOITATION, VIOLENCE, DEATH, AND ILLEGAL
INTERMEDIATION BEHIND THE ITALIAN PASSATA

The 2019 EBAN report on agricultural work in Italy describes a sector
characterized by 1.1 million workers, 90% of whom have a temporary
contract with an average length of 87 days, almost a third of a full-time
agricultural job.14 Having a regular contract means access to a series of
conditions such as the benefit of minimum salary for agricultural workers,
established by means of national collective bargaining at 7.13 euros per hour
and 1,201.84 euros per month, the payment of monthly contributions to the
national social security, and the possession of a contract that can be used to
demonstrate financial conditions allowing easier access to housing and credit.
At the same time, unofficial data produced by civil society associations
and research centers in 2016 revealed that a significant share of those
agricultural workers, between 400,000 and 430,000, are hired irregularly
(i.e., without a correspondence between what is officially declared and the
hours worked), or in a condition of regulatory invisibility (i.e., without any
contract or declaration).15 Of these 400,000 thousand people, 80 percent are
foreigners and about 132,000 are considered to be particularly vulnerable,
marginalized, and in a state of socio-economic marginalization.16
From the apple fields in Piedmont (North-West) to the ghetto of Tre
Capitoli in Foggia (South-East), thousands of women and men employed in
the agriculture industry face systematic violations of working-time rules,
including failure to grant daily breaks, weekly rest periods, and annual
holidays; wages that are half the minimum national requirement 17; payment
in piece rates despite the legislative prohibition; charges to use transport
provided by employers; confiscation of their passports and identity
documents; living in the same place where they work (“which exacerbates
isolation and segregation that in turn increases vulnerability to human rights

14 Press Release, EBAN, Osservatorio EBAN Lavoro Agricolo – Rapporto Annuale 2018 (Apr. 4,
2019) (on file with author).
15 Osservatorio
Placido
Rizzotto,
FLAI
https://www.flai.it/osservatoriopr/osservatorio-placido-rizzotto/.
16

(July

31,

2018),

Id.

FABIO CICONTE & STEFANO LIBERTI, SPOLPATI: LA CRISI DELL’INDUSTRIA DEL POMODORO
TRA
SFRUTTAMENTO
E
INSOSTENIBILITÀ
(2016),
http://www.filierasporca.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/Terzo-Rapporto-Filierasporca_WEB1.pdf.
17
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abuses”)18; inadequate or even inhumane living conditions; forms of control
over workers’ lives by employers, including the use of surveillance. 19
Yet, this is not everything. According to the Placido Rizotto 2018
Report on Agromafie and Caporalato,20 around 60 percent of the migrant
agricultural workers do not have access to clean water or sanitation. Most of
them live in camps (or “ghettos”) and are victims of physical and moral
abuses,21 with sexual violence, blackmails, rapes, and abortions, which have
been recorded throughout the years but seldom denounced, addressed and
dealt with.22 It may not appear so evident when you look at a commercial of
a tasty Italian passata, but the Modern Slavery Index in 2017 recognized that
the situation in Italy is among the most worrisome in the EU, with “the risk
of modern slavery [set] to worsen . . . over the next year, with agriculture a
sector of concern, and the agricultural sector plays a central role in this
direction.”23
Exploitation and violence are not the only two fears of migrant
agricultural workers. As Mangano wrote in June 2018, Italian farms are like
a contemporary “Spoon River,” a graveyard of untold stories of people who
died without notice. Since 2013, more than 1500 farmworkers have lost their
lives, including some Italians working without contracts. Some died because
of the intense heat and the long hours of work; others were smashed by
tractors or falling trees; numerous workers lost their lives in the fires that
regularly break out in the ghettos (e.g., Rosarno in 2018, Borgo Mezzanone
and Rignano Gragnanico in 2019); others were killed by the police or by

18 2018 Findings: Italy, GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX,
www.globalslaveryindex.org/2018/findings/country-studies/italy/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2020) [hereinafter
GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX].
19 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, EXPLOITED LABOUR: MIGRANT WORKERS IN ITALY’S
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR (2012), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/EUR30/020/2012/en/; LETIZIA
PALUMBO, TRAFFICKING AND LABOUR EXPLOITATION IN DOMESTIC WORK AND THE AGRICULTURAL
SECTOR IN ITALY (2016),
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/42406/GGP_TRAFFICKO_2016_EN.pdf?sequence=3&isAl
lowed=y.
20

AA. VV., AGROMAFIE E CAPORALATO (Osservatorio Placido Rissotto ed., 4th ed. 2018).

OXFAM & TERRA! ONLUS, HUMAN SUFFERING IN ITALY’S AGRICULTURAL VALUE CHAIN 3–4
(2018), https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620479/cs-human-sufferingitaly-agricultural-value-chain-210618-en.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y.
21

22 Antonello Mangano, Violentate nel silenzio dei campi a Ragusa. Il nuovo orrore delle schiave
romene,
L’ESPRESSO
(Sept.
15,
2014),
https://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2014/09/15/news/violentate-nel-silenzio-dei-campi-a-ragusa-ilnuovo-orrore-delle-schiave-rumene-1.180119?preview=true; Antonello Mangano, “Se tua moglie non sta
con me non vi pago” Romene nel ragusano tra ricatti e sorprusi, L’ESPRESSO (Oct. 8, 2014),
https://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2014/10/08/news/rumene-nel-ragusano-tra-ricatti-e-soprusi-maora-il-territorio-si-mobilita-1.183497.
23

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX, supra note 18.
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Italian citizens that “did justice themselves,” while a worker was scavenging
some metal parts in an abandoned plot of land.24
Not surprisingly, criminal organizations and organized crime thrived out
of the combination of relevant economic activity, human necessities (eating,
working and surviving), and the state of invisibility, necessity, and need
experienced by hundreds of thousands of people in the country. The central
character in this story is the caporale (gangmaster) who acts as an
intermediary/broker25 between landowners (or tenants) and workers (migrant
or Italian, seasonal or sedentary) to provide cheap labor and obtain personal
economic or social benefit.
Caporali are contacted by farmers (owners or tenants) when work is
needed, and they recruit the men and women who will be spraying the
pesticides, harvesting the produces, and putting the food into boxes. They
will be responsible for the workers during the day and will make sure that
they are efficient and under control. In addition, they will use their knowledge
of the employers, the competition between workers, and their connections
with authorities to make sure that owners can pay less than the minimum
wage. A 2018 report by two non-governmental organizations, Oxfam and
Terra! Onlus, sketches the main characteristics of the caporalato system and
highlights the link between vulnerability, competition, profit, and cheapness:
Gangmasters (caporali) arbitrarily decide who can be part of
their teams. Because there are often more workers than jobs
and because the workers do not have means of
transportation, the caporale takes advantage of workers’
fragile socio-economic status and illegally profits by directly
deducting money from workers’ daily wages. For each day
of work, some workers must pay the caporale a fee of €5 for
transportation to the farm; workers may be also forced to buy
food and water from the caporale at a higher price than it
would cost at the local supermarket (e.g. €1.50 for 50ml

24 Alessia Candito, Migrante ucciso in Calabria a colpi di fucile: era un attivista del sindacato,
LA REPUBBLICA (June 2, 2018),
https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2018/06/03/news/colpi_di_fucile_in_calabria_contro_migranti_un_m
orto_e_due_feriti-198023690/; Antonello Mangano, La strage silenziosa dei campi, dove italiani e
migranti muoiono insieme, L’ESPRESSO (June 15, 2018),
https://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2018/06/11/news/la-strage-silenziosa-dei-campi-dove-italiani-emigranti-sono-uniti-dalla-morte-1.323615.
25 The notions of ‘broker’ and ‘broker capitalism’ have been used in sociology and agri-food
studies to describe the way in which capitalism permeates and unfolds in a market’s peripheries like the
South of Italy. See Domenico Perrotta, GHETTI, BROKER E IMPERI DEL CIBO La filiera agroindustriale del pomodoro nel Sud Italia, CARTOGRAFIE SOCIALI, May 2016, at 261; JANE SCHNEIDER &
PETER SCHNEIDER, CULTURE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN WESTERN SICILY (1976).
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water and €3.50 for a sandwich). At the end of the day, a sum
up to €10 per worker—one-third of a worker’s daily wage—
could be illicitly earned by the caporale and his or her
team.26
Caporalato is not a new phenomenon and is not an Italian peculiarity.
In some countries, like the United Kingdom, the phenomenon of
intermediation in the agricultural sector has been regulated and disciplined
by law, with the Gangmastering (Licensing) Act of 2004 introducing a
system of licensing and standards for agencies that place vulnerable workers
in agricultural work, the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority (GLAA),
and a number of offenses with penalties up to ten years imprisonment for
operating without a license. Yet, in Italy there was no specific criminal
punishment for the illicit intermediation between workers and employers
until 2011, with courts that had to rely on two offenses introduced by legal
reform in 1998, “reducing or holding a person in a condition of slavery or
servitude”27 and the “employment of citizens of third countries without
regular permit.”28 Only then, the legislator decided to introduce a specific
criminal offense concerning the act of “illicit intermediation and exploitation
of labor” with the aim to lower the threshold of criminal liability otherwise
required by the two other crimes and to better adapt to the changing
relationships between workers and owners. Five years later, in 2016, the
discipline of “illicit intermediation” was significantly reformed in its
thresholds, relevant conduct, and penalties by a new “anti-caporalato” law
inspired by the rising voices of migrant workers and civil society
associations. In light of the legal complexity that characterized the state’s
response to the exploitation of workers and, in particular, the illicit
intermediation, the next section introduces the main elements of each of the
three offences and offers some details of the main innovations of the anticaporalato law, along with the opportunities and shortcomings that lie
beneath it.
III. THE CRIMINAL TURN AGAINST ENSLAVEMENT,
INTERMEDIATION, AND EXPLOITATION
The mainstream legislative response against the phenomena of
caporalato and the exploitation of farmworkers belongs to the Italian
criminal code and, in particular, to the section dedicated to the protection of
26

OXFAM & TERRA! ONLUS, supra note 21, at 6.

27

CODICE PENALE [C.P.], art. 600 (It.).

28

Decreto Legislativo 25 juglio 1998, n.286, G.U. Aug. 18, 1998, n.191 (It.).
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people and their individual freedom. After a long legislative journey that
began in 1938, which has been significantly influenced by the European
Directives, the current legal framework is characterized by three separate
offenses that differ in characterization, relevant conduct, legal requirements,
and punishment: (a) “reducing or holding a person in a condition of slavery
or servitude,”29 (b) “employment of citizens of third countries without regular
permit,”30 and (c) the crime of “illicit intermediation and exploitation of
labor.”31 A brief overview of the dispositions is useful to understand the
potential of each provision and, more importantly, the limits of each of them.
A. Reducing or Holding a Person in a Condition of Slavery of
Servitude
Article 600 of the criminal code, as reformed in 2003 and 2014, is a
wide disposition that sanctions the conduct of whoever “exercises over a
person powers corresponding to those of the right of ownership” or
Reduces or holds a person in a state of continuative
subjection (realized through violence, threat, deception,
abuse of authority or profit from a situation of vulnerability,
physical or mental inferiority or a situation of necessity, or
by the promise or payment of sums of money or other
advantages from whom has authority over the person),
forcing the victim to perform work or sexual services or to
beg or to perform any other illegal activity that involves
exploitation or to undergo organ removal.32
Although most of these conditions can be found in the Italian
agricultural sector and some of the conduct reflects that of caporali and
owners, prosecutions have remained the exception and have hardly led to any
judgments, particularly against legal persons whose businesses may be
organized around the work of modern slaves.33 There are multiple reasons

29

CODICE PENALE [C.P.], art. 600 (It.).

30

D.Lgs. n. 286/1998 (It.).

31 CODICE PENALE [C.P.], art. 603 bis, amended by Legge 29 ottobre 2016, n.199, G.U. Nov. 3,
2016, n.257 (It.).
32 Legge 11 agosto 2003, n.228, G.U. Aug. 23, 2003, n.195 (It.); Decreto Legislativo 4 marzo
2014, n.24, G.U. Mar. 13, 2014, n.60 (It.).
33 Caporale’s “criminal” liability is provided by Art. 25 quinquies, Legislative Decree No.
231/2001, but can often be avoided by putting in place an adequate system of due diligence. MARIA
FRANCESCA CUCCHIARA & ANNA BARACCCHI, ASSOCIAZIONE PER GLI STUDI GIURIDICI
SULL’IMMIGRAZIONE, THE ITALIAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK AGAINST LABOUR EXPLOITATION (Paola
Cavanna et. al. eds., 2017).
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why this is the case: the difficulty of getting access to evidence and
testimony, the indeterminacy of the notion of “continuative subjection” and
its incompatibility with seasonal workers, and the reference to violence,
threat or a situation of necessity that is not always compatible with the state
of economic and social precarity in which farmworkers live, and that pushes
them into accepting underpaid, irregular, and extenuating jobs. In addition,
the effectiveness of the norm is affected by the absence of a provision
excluding the possibility of self-incrimination for victims who denounce the
abuses (and the subsequent risk of deportation in the absence of a regular
permit) and by the non-reception of the definition of “condition of
vulnerability” as a “situation in which the person concerned has no real or
acceptable alternative but to submit to the abuse involved” as defined in
Article 2(1) of the Anti-Trafficking Directive 2011/36/UE. In light of this,
the risk of a conviction between eight and twenty years does not seem to
represent a relevant deterrent.
B. Employment of Third Countries’ Citizens Without Regular
Permit
A more specific offense was introduced in 1998 as a response to the
increasing number of undocumented migrants residing in Italy and their
employment in the Italian economy without regular documents.34 In this case,
the target is not the intermediary but the employer, and the main purpose of
the norm seems to be the protection of fair competition among workers rather
than the protection of the workers’ freedom, life, and human rights. In its
original formulation, Article 22(12) of Legislative Decree 286/98 exclusively
focuses on the act of hiring workers without a permit or with an expired
permit, with no reference to the working conditions, the exploitation, the
hours of work, and the payment.35 In 2012, Article 22(12 bis)(c) was
introduced by legislative decree and added the aggravating circumstances of
hiring undocumented workers in conditions of exceptional exploitation and
exposure to great danger.36
Even more than the aforementioned provision on enslavement and
servitude, the criminalization of whomever employs undocumented migrants
is characterized by an irremediable flaw in the lack of the automatic exclusion
of self-incrimination for those migrants who denounce the conditions of
exploitation or denounce the irregularity of their working conditions. In

34

D.Lgs. n. 286/1998 (It.).

35

Id.

36

Decreto Legislativo 16 juglio 2012, n.109, G.U. July 25, 2012, n.172 (It.).
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addition, the exclusive focus on undocumented workers appears incapable of
grasping with the reality of agricultural work in Italy, where a large
percentage of the activities are realized by East Europeans, people with a
residence permit but insufficient understanding of their rights or bargaining
power, and asylum seekers who can regularly reside in Italy while waiting
for the final decision on their status. Rather than an opportunity to improve
workers’ conditions and contribute to a different distribution of value
between capital and labor, Article 22(12) is a double edged sword that
punishes the migrants more than the employers (who face a fine of 5000 euros
per irregular worker and detention between six months and three years),37
does not deal with a large part of the agricultural workforce, and that, if
effective, threatens to significantly reduce the opportunity for undocumented
migrants to find a source of revenue, pushing them into conditions of
increased invisibility and, as a consequence, making them even more
vulnerable and exposed to abuses and criminal organizations.
C. Illicit Intermediation and Exploitation of Labor
The third criminal response to the abuses that characterize the Italian
agricultural sector is represented by an ad hoc offense that challenges the role
of the intermediaries (i.e., the caporali that act as a hub between workers and
employers and use their position to extract value from workers and reduce
costs for employers). Already criminalized in 1949 as a misdemeanor, the
original focus was on protecting the labor market from the abusive practice
of intermediation and not on the protection of workers. It was only in 2011,
after the 2010 “Rosarno riots” that erupted in one of the largest ghettos in
Italy and the 2011 workers strike in Nardó, that the Italian parliament decided
to introduce an ad hoc criminal offense under the rubric of the offences
against people and their freedom. Once enacted, the new Article 603 bis of
the Italian penal code introduced the criminal relevance of the conduct of
those individuals undertaking an organized activity of intermediation (i.e.,
hiring workers or organizing them in the context of exploitative jobs, using
violence, threats, or intimidation, and abusing the needs or necessities of the
workers).38 The focus was on the caporali and the objective was to deter them
from operating.
Besides introducing for the first time in the Italian legal context a
provision that directly addressed the increasing presence of organized crime
in the construction of the agricultural labor market, Article 603 bis also

37

D.Lgs. n. 286/1998 (It.).

38

Legge 14 settembre 2011, n.148, G.U. Sep. 16, 2011, n.216 (It.).
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identified indexes of exploitation that highlighted four different ways in
which labor could be made cheap and, consequently, the value produced by
workers allocated elsewhere along the chain.39 By defining the parameters,
the legislator was trying to draw a picture of caporalato and define the
threshold of legal acceptability and unacceptability. Exploitation was defined
as a combination of (1) the systemic retribution below the national collective
contract or disproportionate to the quality and quantity of labor provided; (2)
the systemic violation of the legal limits and requirements for working hours,
weekly rest, holidays, and leave; (3) the violation of norms on health and
safety that expose workers to personal danger; and (4) the fact that workers
operate in working, housing, or surveillance conditions that are particularly
degrading.40
Some interpretative issues immediately arose, first of all with regards to
the request of a minimum level of organization (of people and capital), which
excluded individual episodes and unorganized forms of intermediation. In
addition, the disjunction between “hiring” or “organizing” workers did not
offer a clear solution to those cases where both activities were undertaken.
Moreover, the need to prove violence, threats, or intimidation suggested that
no measure could be taken in those cases where workers had decided to be
the object of intermediation and had accepted the exploitative labor
conditions, not because of physical or moral constriction but because of their
economic or irregular situations. In addition, the thresholds of exploitation
appeared too high, with the reference to “systematic” retribution,
“systematic” violation, “exposure to danger,” and “particularly” degrading
conditions that appeared to legalize and legitimize occasional forms of
exploitation and those forms of subordination that did not reach levels of
inhumanity. Furthermore, the norm did not introduce any exclusion of selfincrimination for workers who denounced their exploiter and no form of
automatic regularization for irregular workers victims of organized crime.
Finally, despite the relevance of conduct realized by the employer, such as
corresponding low payments and providing degrading housing conditions,
Article 603 bis only criminalized the actions of the caporali, without giving
any relevance to the actions of those who were employing the workers and,
by exploiting them, benefitting from a lower cost of labor and higher
margins.41
Although limited in its application, the introduction of the “anticaporalato” law in 2011 had the merit of providing an immediate legal
response to the thousands of people that had mobilized in Rosarno, Nardó,
39

Legge 29 ottobre 2016, n.199, G.U. Nov. 3, 2016, n.257 (It.).

40

Id.

41

L. n. 148/2011 (It.)
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and in other ghettos around the country, therefore legitimizing their concerns
and contributing to a nationwide conversation around the parameters,
requirements, and best way of tackling the issue.42 In the years that followed,
national and international media started covering the working conditions in
the Italian agricultural sector, and the agricultural sector as a whole witnessed
the multiplication of bottom-up organization and coordination, with more
strikes and acts of resistance happening in Sicily, Calabria, Apulia, and
Lazio.
One of the main results was a new round of legislative debate on the
“anti-caporalato” law and the enactment of an amended version of Article
603 bis in 2016 that introduced four main innovations: the criminalization
and punishment of the conduct of those individuals and legal entities (i.e.,
land owners, tenants, processing companies, etc.) who use, hire, or utilize
workers taking advantage of their situation of need and putting them in a
condition of exploitation, whether or not there has been an intermediation,
and independently on the use of threats and violence; the abandonment of the
idea of “systemic” violations as an index of exploitation in favor of the notion
of “repeated” violations, a condition that is satisfied when the conduct
happens more than once; the exclusive focus on the state of need, defined as
the lack of means to provide for the essential needs of the workers or a
psychological state of fragility that reduces the contractual autonomy of the
worker; and the mandatory confiscation of every means used to commit the
crime, a broad definition that not only includes the land where the mansions
were undertaken, the barracks where the workers were living, and the vans
used for the workers’ transportation, but also the price obtained for the goods
produced by exploited workers, the goods themselves, and any profit
generated illegally.43
The extension of the criminal liability from the intermediaries to those
who hire and exploit workers is not only a legal innovation, but the evidence
of a move towards a more systemic understanding of the link between law,
value chains, and the distribution of power and value.44 If law was only an
instrument of governance and coordination between different actors of the
chain, the new Article 603 bis would have no relevance because it would be
seen as a mere sanctioning tool that intervenes ex post. However, if we
consider legal structures as essential elements in the creation of the condition
to generate, extract, and accumulate value at all levels of the chain, we realize
42 YVAN SAGNET & LEONARDO PALMISANO, GHETTO ITALIA (2015); MARCO OMIZZOLO, SOTTO
PADRONE (2019).
43
44

L. n. 199/2016 (It.).

See IGLP Law & Glob. Prod. Working Grp., The Role of Law in Global Value Chains: A
Research Manifesto, 4 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 57 (2016).
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that the criminal relevance of the conduct of the employers has two main
implications: (a) the recognition that activities undertaken at one point of the
chain (i.e., intermediation) have a consequence at other levels of the chain
(i.e., the cost of labor for the employers and the price of the goods they will
be selling to the market); and (b) redefines the allocation of bargaining power
among the actors of the chain, which lead to a redistribution of value, risks,
and responsibilities. As a matter of optimistic simplification, we could say
that the risk of confiscation of the land, price, and profit would push the
employer into reconsidering the economic viability of cheap labor and
towards implementing forms of employment that do not satisfy the indexes
of exploitation and that, therefore, would be more respectful and more
expensive.
Yet, the attempt by the legislature to redefine the allocative dynamics of
the agri-food chain by giving criminal relevance to conduct undertaken
downstream from the intermediation triggers three other considerations
linked to the possibility of unexpected or underestimated consequences
deriving from the use of isolated legal interventions (which elsewhere I call
“legal chokeholds”45) to address issues that are co-constructed across the
complexity of value chains. Firstly, the identification of the boundary
between legality and illegality of conduct is always left to judicial
interpretation, creating the possibility for exploitative behaviors not to be
considered criminally relevant because of the lack of repetition or the
application of a strict standard of “degrading conditions.” Secondly, the
criminalization of certain conduct in the context of rural areas and
undocumented migrants is often associated with the intensification of the role
of criminal organizations, the sole entity capable of guaranteeing protection
and impunity from the enforcement of punitive and effective laws. Thirdly,
the chain-based approach adopted by the law 199/2016 falls short by not
recognizing that the materiality of the relationship between employers,
intermediaries, and workers is significantly determined by the overall
structure of the chain and by decisions that are taken downstream (i.e., by the
concentration of the processing, trading, and retailing sector in a limited
number of players and by the unequal bargaining power between farmers and
buyers).46
Despite the positive reactions that have accompanied law 166/2019 and
the new text of Article 603 bis, the reality on the ground is that the

45 See Tomaso Ferrando, Land Rights at the Time of Global Production: Leveraging MultiSpatiality and Legal Chokeholds, 2 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 275 (2017).
46 See OXFAM AND TERRA! ONLUS, supra note 21, at 1; Alessandra Corrado, Martina Lo Cascio
& Domenico Perrota, Introduzione. Per un’analisi critica delle filiere e dei sistemi agroalimentari in
Italia, 93 MERIDIANA 9 (2018).
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overemphasis on illicit intermediation and the criminalization of farmers may
have counterproductive effects on workers’ conditions and employment if
not supported by a redefinition of the whole chain and a reconsideration of
the legal structures that allow lead firms operating downstream to exercise
financial and contractual pressure over producers and, as a cascade effect,
that give strong control over the lives of workers. In a nutshell, the
criminalization of intermediation and exploitation of cheap labor can hardly
lead to just working and living conditions if the price received by farmers for
the agricultural products is significantly lower than the cost of producing
them without intermediation and exploitation, and if workers are forced in a
condition of invisibility, socio-economic marginalization, and dependency.
If the price of a kilo of processing tomatoes that remunerates the employer,
pays the minimum salary of all the workers, guarantees that they work the
correct amount of hours, and respects their dignity is thirty (euro) cents per
kilo, the current offers of five to eleven cents a kilo have almost inevitable
implications that cannot be addressed by means of criminal law and
criminalization. Moreover, twenty years of tight migration policies and laws
have increased the number of undocumented and irregular extra-EU workers
residing in the country, creating a “reserve army of workers”47 that are
competing with each other for agricultural jobs but also competing with
documented and regular workers, are afraid of denouncing because of the
fear of repatriation and contribute to a vicious circle of cheapness and
exploitation.
IV. WHAT THE ANTI-CAPORALATO LAW CANNOT GRASP: CHEAP
LABOR AND DISPOSABLE LIVES AS A FUNCTION OF THE
ITALIAN GLOBAL PASSATA
This article began with a celebration of the Italian passata as one of the
most popular Italian foods around the world. Yet, popularity in a very
competitive market that is shared with agricultural giants like the United
States, China, and Spain cannot be achieved with the sole brand and the
quality of “Made in Italy.” Leaving aside the dynamics of the niche markets,
competitiveness requires keeping prices as low as possible by reducing costs,
increasing efficiency, and—why not—producing non-internalized social and
environmental externalities. When we think about the material conditions of
workers farming processing tomatoes across Italy, we have to first embed
them into the transnational food system that not only connects multiple actors

47 FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE CONDITION OF THE WORKING CLASS IN ENGLAND 77 (Mark Harris
ed., Panther ed. 2010).
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within the same “passata chain” (owners, traders, processors, retailers, and
consumers), but also creates competition between different “passata chains,”
often rewarding those who can offer a cheaper product.
In this context, an effective legal and political response cannot be
narrowly focused on the local exploitation but must be capable of
understanding the existence of root causes behind cheap labor, cheap lives,
and cheap nature that are functional to the existence of the global Italian
passata.48 They have to do both with the legal construction of the global chain
and the internal power dynamics between its actors and with the legal
construction of the migrant worker as an invisible, exploitable, available, and
disposable means of production. More importantly, they are interconnected:
the existence of power asymmetries along the chain and the attempt to reduce
costs to increase margins go hand in hand with the search for cheaper labor.
At the same time, the existence of cheap labor creates the conditions for the
Italian passata to be competitive and, therefore, to be integrated in global
chains that reach consumers in the four corners of the planet. However, this
interdependence is missing from the mainstream political and legal debate in
Italy, where the process of criminalization of caporalato is schizophrenically
surrounded not only by legislative attempts to increase the price received by
farmers but also by an intensification of the anti-migrant attitude and a
reduction of the opportunities for migrants to obtain permits and regularly
remain in the country.
Three kinds of legal initiatives are worth noting which represent an
attempt to redress the unequal distribution of power between farmers and
buyers, although they are still in their inception and aim at challenging
“unfair trade practices,” rather than embedding buyer-seller negotiations into
the broader legal, economic, and cultural context. The first one falls in an
area across contract law and competition law and is enshrined in Article 62
of Law Decree 1/2012 and in the recent EU Directive on Unfair Trade
Practices, EU 2019/633.49 Both the national law and the EU Directive apply
to business-to-business (B2B) sales and purchases in the agri-food chain and
aim at increasing the transparency of negotiations; consolidating the certainty
of contracts; introducing minimum requirements in terms of the content of
contracts, changes, and cancellations; and banning certain unfair trading
practices imposed unilaterally by one trading partner (normally the buyer) on
48 Nature is cheap when it can be contaminated with fertilizers and pesticides, when soil can be
depleted, and when natural resources are not regenerated but exclusively extracted. Productivity and
global competition in the passata sector also lead to these behaviors, thus the role of cheap nature should
never be forgotten. See PATEL & MOORE, supra note 12; Susan Marks, Human Rights and Root Causes,
74 MOD. L. REV. 57 (2011).
49 Council Directive 2019/633, 2019 O.J. (L 111) (discussing unfair trading practices in businessto-business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain).
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another. A step forward in the recognition of the power imbalance that
characterizes the agri-food chain and can have an indirect impact on the
agricultural workers, both the law and the Directive refrain from dealing with
the process of price formation and the race to the bottom that is generated by
structural and economic circumstances, such as poor logistics, market
concentration, and lack of alternative markets for products.50
On the contrary, the way in which the agricultural price is determined is
at the core of a bill on double-race tenders that was approved by the House
of Representatives in 2019 and awaits discussion by the Senate.51 The bill on
double-race tenders was strongly invoked by civil society organizations and
media and aims at banning the use by retailers of a mechanism consisting of
two rounds of tenders among processing companies, one before the harvest
and one after the harvest, through which processing companies pre-sell the
passata to the retailer and then negotiate with farmers on the basis of the price
that they have offered. As reported by #FilieraSporca, such a mechanism:
strongly affects the entire value chain, both because of the
speed with which it takes place and because companies are
forced to agree to sales well before production quantities and
costs have been determined. Having pre-sold at very low
prices, processing companies therefore have to negotiate the
lowest possible prices with producers, who must in turn
make savings by hiring the cheapest possible labor or
breaking their contractual obligations to farm workers.52
Yet, low prices continue to be offered to farmers even if double-race
tenders have been discontinued, revealing that it is not only a matter of
negotiation but a structural issue.
The third relevant intervention in this area is the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) as a form of public support of agriculture and, therefore, a
direct subsidy to the cost of production that may reduce farmers’ dependency
on the market and, therefore, increase social and environmental practices.
Leaving aside the specificities of the CAP and the distortive nature of public
subsidies, the EU policy has helped farmers remain in the business but has
not yet triggered virtuous dynamics with regards to working conditions. On
the contrary, the possibility to access the financial support of the CAP has
represented an appealing profit opportunity for Italian criminal organizations,
50 There are 9,456 farms producing processing tomatoes in Italy. However, 95 percent of the
transformation is realized by 91 processing facilities, 21 of which are in the North of the country. See
Perrotta, supra note 5.
51 Atto Senaato n. 1373, Limitazioni alla vendita sottocosto di prodotti agricoli e divieto di aste a
doppio ribasso (It.).
52

#FILIERASPORCA, LA RACCOLTA DEI RIFUGIATI (2016).
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while the CAP itself has intensified the socio-economic inequality between
small-scale and large-scale farmers (putting more pressure on the former and
pushing them towards socio-environmental unsustainable or illegal
practices)53 and has shifted the burden of supporting agriculture from the
market to the public authority. Aware that agriculture is receiving financial
support through the CAP and is considered a central economic activity in the
region, buyers know that they can lower the price per kilo, in a way
privatizing the public resources aimed at the agricultural sector.
From the point of view of agricultural productivity, the limited
effectiveness of the measures aimed at increasing revenues and bargaining
power of farmers is somehow “counterbalanced” by the normalization of a
state of emergency,54 the increased criminalization of “irregular” or
undocumented migrants, and the intensification of the xenophobic attitude of
both policy makers and the broad public. Only in the last two years, the
Ministerial Decree of 20 November 2018 on the role and function of the
centers of initial reception and the “Security Decree” carrying the name of
the then Minister of Internal Affairs Matteo Salvini55 have weakened, as
clearly stated in a 2019 report by Amnesty International, “the condition of
the asylum seeker and of those migrants who receive protection, . . .
producing social marginalization and ghettoization that are more likely to be
exploited by criminal interests and mafia organizations (exploiters,
traffickers, caporali and Mafiosi).”56
This article is not the appropriate space to discuss the details of all the
measures introduced in the last two years, which span from the cut of
financial support to the centers of first reception and the denial of registration
for asylum seekers, nor to provide a detailed analysis of the way in which
they materially and legally impact the life and opportunities of non-EU
citizens. Yet, to understand the connection between the emergency decrees,
the creation of a labor reserve army and the thriving of illicit intermediation
it is enough to consider that almost 87,000 people lost their right to live in
Italy as a consequence of the new decrees and that on January 1, 2020, they
also lost the right to be hosted in a reception center.

53 In 2013, the top 0.8 percent of the beneficiaries of the Common Agricultural Policy received
26.3 percent of the full amount of resources disbursed in favor of the whole Italian agricultural sector.
More interestingly, 0.001 percent of the farms (150 in total) received around 6 percent of all the direct
payments aimed from Brussels to the sector. The remaining 94 percent of farms shared just 39.5 percent
of all CAP subsidies. Commission Factsheet on CAP Expenditure in 2013 by Member States (2015).
54

GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: IL POTERE SOVRANO E LA NUDA VITA (1995).

55

Decreto legge 4 ottobre 2018, n.113, G.U. Oct. 4, 2018, n.231 (It.).

AMNESTY INT’L, I SOMMERSI DELL’ACCOGLIENZA CONSEGUENZE DEL DECRETO LEGGE
113/2018 SUL SISTEMA DI ACCOGLIENZA ITALIANO (2019).
56
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For sure, the Italian legal framework contains ad hoc forms of protection
in the case of extra-EU citizens who are victims of violence or exploitation,
such as the permit for social protection57 and the permit for those who are
victims of labor exploitation.58 However, they have a limited length (six
months that can be renewed if the conditions remain), and their interpretation
by the public prosecutors is increasingly subordinating their release to the
provision of relevant information on the exploiters and to the proof of an
actual and serious danger for the migrant. More precisely, non-EU migrants
who are victims of exploitation and abuses would only be protected if they
actively contributed to the investigation against the perpetrator and if they
could provide evidence that they are facing a serious and immediate danger.
Thus, the discipline seems to overlook the cultural, personal, and economic
obstacles towards denouncing and cooperating and, more importantly,
normalizes forms of exploitation that are not dangerous or immediate.
Considering the broader context and the increasing criminalization of
migration, it should not come as a surprise that these permits have not been
particularly effective and that they are not seen as valuable options by nonEU farmworkers who populate the Italian countryside.59
The moment we move away from the tomato and we embed it into the
wider legal and economic context of global passata chains and global human
mobility, it becomes evident how inappropriate it would be to look at
caporalato in isolation from the rest of the legal, economic, and social
context in which migrants, caporali, and farmers are embedded. Yet, despite
the interconnectedness between people, places, and issues, national and
regional legal solutions reproduce a waterproof attitude that cannot grasp the
plurality of legal structures that define rights, produce value, and allocate
power. Although the new anti-caporalato law of 2016 represents a step
forward compared to the previous version (mainly because it moves beyond
the worker–caporale dynamic to include employers as the beneficiaries of
the exploitative practices), it appears inadequate and potentially a source of
serious unexpected consequences both for workers and farmers. A radical
intervention is thus needed, which redefines power relationships through the
lenses of migratory status, distribution of value across the chain, and the race
to the bottom generated by the global competition that characterizes the
market for processing tomatoes, passata, and other tomato-based products.
Yet, is such radical intervention desired?

57

D.Lgs. n. 286/98, art. 18 (It.).

58

D.Lgs. n. 286/98, art. 22 ¶ 12 (It.).

59

In the five years after the introduction of Article 603 bis in 2011, only 500 workers denounced
the caporali, a number that is equivalent to 0.1 percent of the victims of caporalato.
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V. TRANSNATIONAL COLLABORATION TO ESCAPE THE POLITICAL
AND LEGISLATIVE “CATCH-22”
This article has offered a critical legal and chain-based analysis of the
forms of labor exploitation that lie behind the Italian passata (tomato sauce)
as a product that is known all over the world and that makes Italy a world
leader after the United States and before China. In line with mainstream legal
accounts, the story began with a depiction of the severe abuses suffered by
hundreds of thousands of workers in the Italian agricultural sector (mainly
non-EU citizens) and connected them with the thriving phenomenon of
caporalato, (i.e., the illicit intermediation between workers and employers)
which is often conducted by members of Mafia.
Moreover, this article is also an attempt to depart from the dominant
reading of caporalato as a problem of the Mafia and has suggested that it is
incorrect and ineffective to focus on the workers–intermediary–employer
relationships without embedding them in the broader context of the whole
passata chain and in the even wider context of the legal construction of illegal
and irregular migrants. It is only then, I believe, that it is possible to expose
the root causes of one of the most significant problems faced by the Italian
agricultural sector and to question the role of law (contract law, EU law,
criminal law and—more importantly—migration law) in producing cheap
lives and cheap labor. No criminal intervention and no anti-caporalato law
will be effective until workers are emancipated from their current condition
of invisibility and vulnerability and their value along the chain is fairly and
justly distributed in order to adequately remunerate labor and nature.
Yet, are we sure that emancipation and just prices is what Italy (as a
government, a legislative body, and as one of the largest economies in the
world) really wants? The annual value of Italian tomatoes’ derivatives
(including the “gangmastered” passata) is estimated at 3.3 billion euros, half
of which is exported. Moreover, workers’ exploitation does not only concern
the red vegetables, but the whole Italian agricultural sector, whose economic
value exceeds 55 billion euros every year and which represented 41 billion
euros in export in 2017.60 A reform aimed at agricultural workers, which
recognizes their legal status and their full rights, enforces the payment of
minimum salaries and appropriate working hours, and guarantees the
provision of healthy living conditions and social security, etc., would
certainly redefine the power dynamics at the bottom of the chain and move
the labor reserve army away from the control of criminal organizations.
However, such intervention would likely cause an increase in the costs of

60

ISMEA, supra note 7, at 13.
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production, possible higher prices for the passata, and a reduction in the
competitiveness of Italian processing tomatoes vis-à-vis varieties farmed
elsewhere under different labor and production conditions. In addition, an
increase in the cost of labor without any form of public support to the farmers
(such as procurement of the tomatoes at a price that guarantees a living wage
to the workers) may create an incentive towards mechanization and nudge
farmers to replace workers with machines, thus erasing the potential positive
impact of regularization of workers’ lives, generating more unemployment
and urbanization, and also intensifying the process of land concentration in
favor of wealthier producers and the abandonment of the countryside by
smallholders.
Once again, these considerations are valid only if we do not pay enough
attention to the way in which labor relations and individuals are embedded in
longer chains populated by multiple actors who appropriate and accumulate
value. If we only look at the cost of production that may correspond to higher
legal standards, it is true that legislators and small-scale farmers may appear
trapped in a “catch-22” where cheap lives and cheap labor contribute to the
global competitiveness of the Italian passata, to affordable products that can
be bought in supermarkets all over the world, and to the permanence of
farmers on the land. However, if we adopt a food system approach to
gangmastering and illicit intermediation, we realize that the higher cost of
production associated with regularization and the full respect of people’s and
workers’ rights is a problem only if we take for granted that the value of a
passata must be distributed in the same way that it is distributed today and if
we assume that there is no alternative to global competition.
Regarding the first point, it is enough to consider that out of an average
price of 1.3 euros per bottle of passata, almost 53 percent is appropriated by
the retailer, while the current remuneration of farmers is around 8 percent,
and the processor receives 18 percent. If we start from the assumption that
the current distribution of value along the chain cannot be changed, we can
only conclude that a more expensive Italian passata would lead to higher
prices, thus putting the burden on the consumers and reducing the
consumption. However, if we read the same figures through the lenses of
annual profits and dividend distribution of global retailers, which in some
cases reach the billions, we realize the importance of questioning the current
distribution of value and the priority that is often attributed to rewarding
private investors over labor and consumers.
For what concerns the possibility for more expensive Italian tomatoes
to be replaced with tomatoes harvested elsewhere, it would be too naïve to
say that Italian tomatoes are unique and that the Italian flag guarantees a
comparative advantage. As a matter of fact, production of processing
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tomatoes in the US, China, and Spain is increasing,61 and international trade
law rules that allow countries to limit the import of products obtained in
violation of human rights have very limited leverage at the moment.62 Thus,
the legal and political fight against caporalato and exploitation undertaken
in the Italian countryside will have to be supported by public measures, such
as public procurement and incentives to rural development, along with an
intensification of the collaboration between workers and farmers operating in
different countries that replaces the mechanisms of pure economic
competitiveness with a more sophisticated notion of sustainable
competitiveness based on principles of social and environmental justice.
The transition from competition to collaboration is intellectually,
economically, and legally complex and not easy to envisage. However, a
move away from price-based competition and the narrative of “winners and
losers of the market” appears essential if we want to find a third way to the
alternative between maintaining exploitation and fostering depeasantization.
In a competitive context, cheapness represents an advantage and an
opportunity to drive other businesses out of the market. Collaboration, on the
contrary, shall guarantee that socio-environmental improvements obtained at
one point of one chain (e.g., farmworkers in Italy in the passata chain) are
not going to come back as a boomerang in the form of unemployment,
delocalization, or mechanization.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the example of the Italian passata discussed in this paper
has proved the need for a chain-based and legal-pluralist approach when
analyzing and engaging with forms of exploitation like gangmastering, which
are embedded in longer value chains and involve multiple actors operating at
different levels and—in some cases—jurisdictions. In addition, the search for
effective solutions in the context of a global market for tomatoes’ derivatives
has highlighted the role of economic considerations in potentially
constraining the actions of the legislator and the inherent limits of price-based
competitiveness as an incentive to produce and exploit cheap labor and cheap
lives. Thus, a call has been made for holistic and collaborative interventions
that address the root causes underlying workers’ exploitation in the Italian
agricultural sector, focus on the current distribution of value across the chain,
and identify viable solutions to the potential regressive implications of

61

See Perrotta, supra note 25.

62

General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs art. XX, Apr. 14, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187.
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fighting gangmastering without a right-based vision of the future of food and
the legal emancipation of agricultural workers.

